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In February 2004, after more than 100 accusations of sexual assault over eighteen months, former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld ordered an investigation into the occurrence and handling of sexual assault overseas. A subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee completed and released the report in May. One month later, the United States Army released a similar report. The Department of Defense report found that existing sexual assault response programs in all branches of the military lacked integration and means of effective implementation. None of the programs even offered a formal definition of sexual assault, making it diffi cult to identify cases and calculate statistics. The Army report found that claims of sexual assault and harassment had increased by more than twenty-fi ve percent over a period of five years.
Both reports found the military unable to respond to the needs of sexual assault victims, from fi rst-response medical care to follow-up investigations and lawsuits. Commanders were insuffi ciently trained to react to sexual assault if not downright hostile to female soldiers’ attempts to fi le sexual assault claims. In addition, there was no formal system of accountability, so that even fi led claims were overlooked.
When Danielle, whose last name has been withheld to protect her privacy, regained consciousness and managed to run (naked, still tied and gagged, and bleeding) back to her camp, she was driven to an aid station where the resident doctor performed a perfunctory rape examination. Afterward, she was again left alone. She received no treatment for injuries to her head, back, or knees. According to the Defense Department report, her experience was typical or even better than average. Many military camps do not have rape kits available, let alone pregnancy tests, HIV tests, and emergency contraception.
In addition to inadequate medical care, commanders’ responses are often poor, and victims lack emotional support. Danielle’s superiors ignored her repeated requests to see a chaplain. Instead, they interviewed Danielle for three hours, after which her commanding offi cer scheduled her to take a polygraph test to confi rm that she was telling the truth about the incident. “I was hysterical,” she said later. “There I am, all bruised up and beaten, and somebody wanted me to take a test.” While sexual assault counselors may be provided to some victims stationed within the United States, none are available on overseas bases. There is an 800 number that supposedly serves as a 24-hour rape crisis hotline, “but no one had a phone,” reports a female soldier stationed at Camp Victory. Even if they did, anyone who calls the hotline invariably gets a recording telling callers to leave a message.
Often, commanders’ insensitivity turns into hostility. Kathy Gilberd, co-chair of the National Lawyers’ Military Law Task Force, says there is a “tendency to cover up assaults and to harass or retaliate against the women who report assaults.” Because the military lacks a chain of command structure that ensures privacy to victims, once a claim is fi led it becomes common knowledge throughout the camp.
Commanding officers often leave victims in the same units as their accused attackers even after they fi le a claim, allowing the attacker and his friends opportunities to retaliate. “People who report assaults face illegal efforts to protect the assaulters, informal harassment from assaulters, their friends, or the command itself,” says Gilberd. In addition to the fear of retaliation, “the fact that these women have to salute the individual who attacked them adds tremendous emotional trauma,” says Christine Hansen of the Miles Foundation, an advocacy organization that helps women who claim to have been assaulted by fellow soldiers in Iraq.
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