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In 2004, Region 8 ran a small-scale fi ve-day drill to identify areas of their protocol that still needed work. Hypothetically, they imagined that only 1000 people were infected with smallpox, although a real attack would likely spread more rapidly. Still, their test run was a failure. “We really have no plan [as to] how to handle a large number of fatalities in Connecticut,” Rubano admitted. “We’ve come to the obvious conclusion that we’re not going to be able to respond in the manner that most people are used to like calling an ambulance or going to the hospital.” After three years of preparation, the New Haven Department of Health still has not found the locations, volunteers, and resources needed to solve the bioterrorism crisis.
Initially, the Bioterrorism Department focused exclusively on smallpox. Now they are responsible for all outbreaks of infectious disease, whether naturally occurring or artifi cially created. Rubano spends much of his time drafting emergency response plans, meeting with various hospital coordinators, security offi cials, and sanitation engineers in the area, and organizing advertisement campaigns to promote personal hygiene and prevent the spread of disease. Through complicated bureaucratic pathways, regional and local committees are expected to cooperate to keep Connecticut safe.
During the E. coli outbreak in September 2006, the
bioterrorism department called every restaurant owner in
New Haven to ensure that they removed spinach from their
menus. Not surprisingly, the task took a long time to complete – perhaps too long, had the threat been more serious.
Rubano is now working to improve the speed at which the
health department communicates with restaurants, grocery
stores, nursing homes, daycares, and schools. His offi ce has
updated their databases and is investigating the possibility
of communicating by radio. “We’re learning from our
mistakes,” Rubano says. “We’re still evolving, and we’ll be
much better off in two years.”